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  1ABSTRACT 
Cotton plays a strategic role in the development policies and poverty reduction 
programs of a number of African countries.  Several African countries have introduced 
reforms in the cotton sector to improve its quality and competitiveness.  The impact of 
these reforms has to date been virtually nullified by the fact that certain WTO Members 
continue to apply support measures and subsidies that distort global market prices.  These 
are the arguments behind the Cotton Initiative raised in 2003 in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, which reflects the position 
of the African Group countries until the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong 
Kong recently.  In this conference two important policy changes were agreed in 
international trade of cotton.  First, all forms of export subsidies for cotton will be 
eliminated by developed countries in 2006.  Second, developed countries will give duty 
and quota free access for cotton exports from the least-developed countries (LDCs).   
This paper uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Zambian 
economy with a three fold purpose: (a) to study the impact of the Doha Round agreement 
on the cotton sector in Zambia, (b) to analyze the reality of the Doha agreement versus 
the African countries’ cotton initiative during the WTO Hong Kong conference, and (c) 
to contribute to the analysis of further agricultural trade liberalization and its implications 
for poor countries.  The results show the extent of the benefits of implementation of both, 
the Doha WTO Round and the African Countries Proposal in Zambia.  We quantify the 
impacts of both policy initiatives on the Zambian cotton sector (production, exports, 
prices), and agrarian population welfare.  The results show that the positive effects of the 








  2Introduction  
In 2002, world cotton trade increased by more than 400,000 tons, attaining 6.2 
million tons.  A third of cotton production is traded internationally.  Cotton, comprising 
only 0.12% of total merchandise trade, is a small part of the economic activity in 
industrialized countries.  However cotton production and trade play an important role in 
some Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in West and Central Africa.  Cotton production 
and trade are vital activities in the economic and social lives of several African countries, 
sustaining the livelihoods of millions of poor households and contributing in several 
countries as much as 40 percent to total merchandise exports and more than 5 percent to 
total GDP (Baffes, 2004).  Thus, it is not surprising that many million Africans depend 
directly on cotton production and exports.  In many developing countries, where the 
scope of substituting cotton for other crops is limited, the cotton cultivation extension has 
played an important role in reducing poverty.  Consequently, cotton’s role in the 
development of policies and poverty reduction programs of a number of African 
countries is strategic.  But, the drop in world cotton prices had endangered the benefits of 
cotton sector (Gillson et al., 2005). 
Several African countries have introduced reforms in the cotton sector and have 
made the necessary adjustments to improve quality and competitiveness in this 
agricultural production.  At least six cotton producing countries in Eastern and Southern 
Africa initiated a reform process during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  These countries 
are Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Poulton et al. 
2004), which comprise 85 percent of the region’s cotton production (Baffes, 2004).  
Reforms were introduced in 1995 in Zambia, the country chosen for this study.  
  3The impact of these reforms on the development of the African countries has been 
to date practically nullified by the fact that certain World Trade Organization (WTO) 
members continue applying domestic support, import restrictions, and export subsidies.  
These policies, contrary to the basic objectives of the World Trade Organization (WTO, 
TN/AG/SCC/GEN/2), distort global market prices.  Townsend and Guitchounts (1994) 
estimated that in the early 1990s more than two-thirds of cotton was produced in 
countries with some form of government interference. 
Support to cotton producers has been greatest in the United States, followed by 
China and the European Union (EU).  For 2001/02, combined supports to the cotton 
sector were US$2.3 billion, US$1.2 billion, and US$700 for the United States, China and 
EU (to Greece and Spain) respectively.  Subsidies encourage surplus cotton production, 
which is then sold on the world market at subsidized prices (Gillson et al.,2005).  This 
has depressed world cotton prices, hurting those developing countries which rely on 
cotton exports for a large part of their foreign exchange earnings.  
The U.S. cotton policies, being the second-largest cotton producer and by far the 
largest exporter, are extremely important in the cotton trade arena.  The history of cotton 
subsidies in the United States is long and constitute part of the commodity programs 
introduced in the early 1930s.  The U.S. cotton program is extremely generous.  For 
instance, in 1997 (the first year of the 1996 Farm Bill), U.S. cotton growers received 
$878 million, of which approximately $700 million came in the form of decoupled 
payments, and the rest as an insurance subsidy payments and in 1998 government 
payments were $1.2 billion (Baffes, 2004).  Even though spending for export subsidies 
was limited to US$201 million for the 1996–2002 period, it was exceeded by the end of 
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providing an additional US$200 million in 2000 and US$430 million through 2002 for 
export subsidies (Gillson, et al.,2004).    
As consequence of the massive U.S. cotton subsidies and their strong impact on 
world markets, a number of reactionary steps were taken by other countries.  Two of 
which have significant policy implications.  On the policy front, a WTO dispute 
settlement was brought by Brazil in 2003, asserting losses to its cotton exports due to 
subsidies by the United States (WTO, 2002).  During this dispute resolution, it was found 
that the United States paid $ 3.2 billion in annual cotton subsidies and $1.6 billion in 
export credits.  In March, 2005 the WTO panel concluded that U.S. policies were 
adversely impacting world trade in cotton, which was so prejudicial for Brazil and other 
exporters such as West African countries, and, consequently these policies should be 
eliminated.  Accordingly, this case, which constitutes the first formal challenge to the 
massive agricultural subsidies provided by rich nations to their farmers, ended with the 
victory to Brazil (WTO, 2004).  Finally, U.S. cotton export subsidies are calculated to be 
US$3 (Malik, 2005).  
China leads cotton production and consumption in the world.  China began to 
offer protective policies to cotton growers in 1953.  Currently, major barriers for cotton 
trade include state trading, tariffs, value-added tax (VAT), tightened import licensing 
procedures, and export subsidies.  Cotton producers also receive price support measures, 
subsidies to cover the transaction cost, and public stockholding.  However, since China’s 
accession into the WTO, China’s farmers have been progressively more exposed to the 
market forces while U.S. and European farmers continue to be protected.  
  5In the European Union, cotton support began when Greece (1981) and Spain 
(1986) joined the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  Before the 
accession to the European Union, during the 1960s and 1970s Greece and Spain together 
were producing 130,000 tons of cotton.  But, once they became European members and, 
were eligible for CAP funds, cotton production increased by an annual average of 7.3 
percent and exceeded 400,000 tons during the 1990s (Baffes, 2004).  These two countries 
together accounted for 2.5 percent of world production and 6 percent of world exports in 
2001.  However, with a subsidy of US$979 million in 2001/02, they accounted for 16 
percent of world cotton subsidies in 2001(Gillson et al.,2005).  EU cotton export 
subsidies were found to be US$4 billion (Malik, 2005). 
Regarding market access, the World Integrated Trade Solution Database (World 
Bank/UNCTAD, 2003) shows that the average cotton world tariff is 5.3 percent.  
However, cotton tariffs varied between a high of 90 percent (by China) to 0 percent (by 
64 countries including the EU).  Of the other largest cotton-producing countries, Brazil 
imposes a tariff of 9.2 percent, India a tariff of 5 percent, Pakistan 5 percent and 
Uzbekistan 30 percent.  Import textiles containing African cotton are favored by the U.S. 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).  Nevertheless, imports of raw cotton are 
excluded of this agreement and U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for 
developing countries. 
On April 31, 2003, four West African cotton producing countries (Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, and Mali) submitted a joint proposal to the WTO containing two vital 
demands.  First, they wanted United States, China, and the European Union to eliminate 
the support given to the cotton sectors.  Second, they demanded a fair compensation for 
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known as the ‘Cotton initiative’ (WTO, 2003).  The cotton initiative received 
considerable attention during the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Cancun (10-
14 September 2003).  Numerous countries were sympathetic to the initiative, including 
Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Cameroon, Guinea, India, Senegal, and South 
Africa.  Despite this contrite, the inability to deal effectively with this initiative was one 
of the reasons for the failure to reach agreement in Cancun. 
The heart of this initiative contained proposals on all three “pillars” (domestic 
supply, market access, and export subsidies) of the agricultural negotiations and reflects 
the position of the African Group countries until the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Hong Kong recently.  Concretely, in this conference they demanded: (a) elimination of 
80% cotton domestic supports by 2006, 10% in year 2007 and 10% in year 2008, b) duty 
and quota free access for the LCD’s cotton and cotton products to developed country 
markets, and c) removal of cotton export subsidies by the end of 2006.  In Hong Kong, 
their voice was heard, and in its final declaration two important amendments in 
international cotton trade was reached.  First, from the start of the implementation period 
(from 2006) developed countries will provide tariffs and quota free access for poor 
countries’ cotton exports.  Second, all forms of export subsidies for cotton by developed 
countries are to be eliminated in 2006 (WTO,2006).  It remains to be seen whether 
African cotton exporters can effectively compete with developed countries’ cotton 
producers given the massive production subsidies in the rich countries.  Will this success 
be a catalyst for poverty reduction in Africa as the developing countries claimed?  This 
paper tries to provide the answer to this question by considering one African country, 
  7which belongs to the LDCs and already had implemented cotton reforms and significant 
producer of cotton: Zambia.   
Cotton production in Zambia increased from 42,000 tons in 2003/2004 to 180,000 
tons in 2004/2005 and furthermore cotton is one of the most important export crops, 
reaching $100 million in foreign exchange earnings in 2004.  Several economic reforms 
were adopted in Zambia during the last decade including the elimination of marketing 
boards in cotton and trade liberalization. A free international cotton market will benefit 
Zambian producers, and also workers in cotton sector, as it will lead to an increase in the 
cotton world price.  
The purpose of this analysis is three fold: (a) to study the impact of the Doha 
Round agreement on the cotton sector in Zambia, (b) to analyze the reality of the Doha 
agreement versus the African countries’ cotton initiative during the WTO Hong Kong 
conference, and (c) to contribute to the analysis of further agricultural trade liberalization 
and implications for poor countries.  This analysis is undertaken by developing a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Zambian economy based on the 
social accounting matrix (SAM) of this country.  We will run simulations for baseline 
and alternate scenarios.  The baseline encompasses the existing policies whereas the two 
scenarios incorporate (a) the Doha Round policies, and (b) the African countries 
proposals, respectively.  
The paper is structured as follows.  First, we introduce a short description of the 
Zambian economy highlighting on the huge importance of its cotton sector.  Second, we 
present a detailed review of the existing studies of the effects of the trade liberalization 
on cotton world prices.  Third, we discuss about the social accounting matrix employed in 
  8our study.  Fourth, we explain in detail the CGE model results of the different scenarios 
on Zambian cotton production, exports, prices, and welfare of agrarian population.  
Finally, we will present our conclusions.  
The Zambian economy 
The Republic of Zambia or Zambia is located in Southern Africa.  Its border 
countries are Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.  Zambia, with a GDP (purchasing power parity) of 
$10.23 billion, a GDP per capita of $900, and a real GDP growth rate of 5% in 2005, is 
one of the poorest countries in the world with belongs to the LDCs (CIA).  This poverty 
can be defined in terms of difficult access to income and employment opportunities  
(United Nations, 2005).  In 2005 around 67% of the Zambian population lived bellow the 
poverty line (monetary value of a basket of commodities that allow a person to achieve a 
minimum caloric requirement).  64% of the population lives on less than $1 per day.  
This poverty affects especially the Zambian rural population.  In 2004 extreme poverty in 
rural areas was 74%, in contrast with the 52% accounted by the urban areas (United 
Nations, 2005).   
In 2005 the labor force was equal to 4.8 million. The 50% of the Zambian labor 
force was unemployed.  The labor was principally employed in agriculture (85%), 
followed by services (9%), and industry (6%). The public debt was 104.2% of the GDP  
(CIA).    
The undernutrition affects about 50% of children under age 5.  The death rate is 
19.93 deaths per 1,000 habitants and the infant mortality rate is 19.93 deaths per 1,000 
persons.  The life expectance at birth is 40.03 years.  
  9Cotton is the most important Zambian export crops, reaching $100 million in 
foreign exchange earnings in 2004.  In 2004 cotton lint was the leading agricultural good 
exported and cottonseed and cotton wastes were the seventh and eighteen, respectively 
(FAO Statistics).  Cotton seed sales constitute a huge cash income source in Zambian 
rural households (Balat and Porto 2005a).   Furthermore cotton production in Zambia 
increased from 42,000 tons in 2003/2004 to 180,000 tons in 2004/2005.   
Several cotton sector reforms were adopted in Zambia during the last decade in 
order to improve the quality of the product and to be more competitive in the 
international markets.  Before 1994 the cotton sector was extremely intervened.  The 
government policies were basically input subsidies and price guaranties.  Since 1977 until 
1994 the only connection between the local and the international market was the Lint  
Company of Zambia (Lintco).  This company behaved as a monopoly in credit loans and 
input sales to the cotton farmers and as monopsony in the seed cotton markets (Balat and 
Porto 2005b).  One of the most important reforms adopted during the mid-1990s was the 
elimination of the marketing boards (Balat and Porto 2005a).  Lintco was liberalized in 
1994.  This fact promoted the market entry; rising a regional private monopolies phase in 
the Zambian cotton market.  In 1999 the competition increased considerably (Brambilla 
and Porto 2005).  At the moment out grower-schemes (agreements by which cotton firms 
provide inputs on loans that may be repaid by the farmers at the yield time)   carry out 
most of the cotton production in Zambia.   
The Effects of the Trade Liberalization on Cotton World Prices 
 
  Due to the increasing importance of the cotton in the international negotiations 
arena, especially since the WTO Brazil/USA case, an the plight of African cotton 
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liberalization on world production, consumption, trade, prices, and cotton farmers’ 
welfare in the developing countries in particular.  Studies of this kind are continuing to be 
conducted.  These studies differ in the countries considered, products, period, baseline 
and alternative scenarios, data, elasticities, and modeling approach, which makes it so 
difficult to compare.  We will summarize the most relevant studies dealing with the 
possible effects of trade liberalization on the cotton sector, with focus on world cotton 
prices changes (see Table1).  We will use these prices changes to analyze the impacts of 
trade liberalization on Zambian cotton sector.   
 
Valderrama (2000) studied the effects of U.S. subsidies removal on the 
international cotton prices.  He employed the International Cotton Advisory Committee 
(ICAC) Price Model, which is a forecasting tool consisting of a single equation 
regression relating prices, U.S. export market share and stock-to-use ratios.  He 
concluded that as the result of U.S. subsidy elimination the average international cotton 
price would rise by 6 cents related to 1999/00 prices. 
FAPRI (2002a) used a multimarket nonspatial partial equilibrium model to study 
the impact of the multilateral removal of agricultural border measures and farm programs 
on developing countries.  Country submodels with grains, other crops, oilseeds, livestock, 
and dairy products for 34 countries constituted the modelling system, which is solved for 
world prices.  The baseline scenario incorporated the URAA, the CAP and China and 
Taiwan’s WTO accession.   Two alternative scenarios were run: the first scenario is 
liberalization of both domestic and trade policies and the second is only trade policy 
liberalization.  The period of study includes 2002/2003 to 2011/2012.  This study found 
  11that under complete liberalization world cotton prices would increase on average by 
11.44% and under elimination of trade barriers only by 2.93%.   
FAPRI (2002b) used the same methodology as the paper described above 
(FAFRI, 2002a).  The FAPRI 2002 World Agricultural Outlook for 2002-2011 formed 
the baseline.  The alternative scenarios were, once again, the complete cotton market 
liberalization, and, the trade liberalization (elimination of border measures).  The 
estimated increases in prices were 15% above the baseline for the complete liberalization 
scenario, and 4% for the only trade liberalization. 
Tokarik (2003) using a partial equilibrium model, provided quantitative 
estimates of the impact of removing agricultural domestic policies comprising of, export 
subsidies, production subsidies, and input subsidies.  The PSE/CSE database (OECD, 
2001) provided this study with data on agricultural support for all commodities except 
cotton.  The support data of cotton were constructed from budget data maintained by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  The PSE/CSE database provides information on 
production, subsidy rates, and input subsidies.   The PSE/CSE measurement captures 
the difference between consumer and world prices.  Data for trade flows were taken 
from the Food and agricultural Organization (FAO).  The benchmark for all the data 
was 2000.  The values of domestic demand and supply elasticities for various 
commodities and countries were taken by Gardiner et al. (1989).  The import demand 
used in the majority of the cases is -0.75, while the export supply elasticity has a range 
between 1.5 to 10.  The model was used to perform four simulations: removal of 
market-price support, production subsidies, input subsidies, and all forms of support.  
The resulting cotton price increase is 2.8%, which can be decomposed as 2.0% increases 
  12for production subsidy removal, and a 0.8% rise for price support elimination. 
Sumner (2003) estimated the effects of the removal of the five U.S. policies 
(marketing loan, direct and production flexibility contract payments, market loss 
assistance and counter-cyclical payments, crop insurance, and export credit guarantee 
subsidies) for U.S. upland cotton production and export subsidies over the marketing 
years 1999-2002.  He adapted the FAPRI (2002a) econometric simulation model for his 
study.   This model replicates historical prices and quantities using a multi-commodity, 
multi-country simulation framework.  All the relevant data were taken from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), while the elasticities were taken from FAPRI.  The 
cotton supply and demand elasticities utilized were 0.3 for the supply, –0.25 for the 
demand, while the U.S. export demand elasticity ranged between -2.5 and –4.0.  The 
baseline results were from the FAPRI model including the six cotton domestic policies.  
The seven alternative scenarios were: six for the removal of each of the U.S. relevant 
subsidies separately, and one for the elimination of all of the policies.  The results of this 
study show that the world cotton price would have raised by 12.6 % without the U.S. 
policies.  The model also compared baseline projections based on the Farm Security and 
Rural Investment Act (FSRI Act) of 2002 and the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 
2000 in order to predict the possible impact of the upland cotton subsidies elimination in 
the period 2003-2007.  This study   predicted an increase on world market cotton prices 
of 10.8%.   
Pan et al. (2004) analyzed the possible effects of U.S. cotton liberalization in 
world cotton prices.  These authors used a partial equilibrium structural econometric 
model containing the 24 principal cotton importers and exporters.  The baseline scenario 
  13contained the 2004 U.S. farm programs.  The alternative scenario consisted of the 
elimination of The U.S. loan rate, target price, and direct, countercyclical, and step two 
payments.  This study predicted an increase in the world cotton price of 2.14% for 0.86% 
for 2004/05 and 2013/14 respectively. 
Poonyth et al. (2004) studied the impact of cotton subsidies on the international 
prices, production, and welfare by using the Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model 
(ATPSM) developed by UNTAC and FAO.  This model, based on the multi-region, 
partial equilibrium, static models, contains 36 agricultural products and 161 countries or 
country groups.  Using the base period 1996/00,  the model was utilized to run four 
different simulations by varying the demand and supply elasticities.  The results obtained 
suggest changes in the international cotton prices ranged between 3.1% and 4.8%, with 
larger changes arising from more inelastic demand.  
Goreux (2004) estimated using a standard partial equilibrium model the changes 
in the international cotton prices resulting from the elimination of the cotton subsidies in 
United States, China, Greece, and Spain.  The basic reasoning of his study is as follows,  
cotton farmers receive the world price ( ) in non-subsidizing countries, while they 
receive this price plus a subsidy  in the subsidized countries.  Therefore, if the 
subsidies were eliminated, prices received by farmers in the subsidizing countries would 
fall.  Consequently, farmers in these countries will produce less and thereby reducing the 
international supply (shifting the supply curve to the left).  This leads to a new 
equilibrium with higher world price.  Goreux calculated this new equilibrium assuming 
that the supply and demand elasticities are 0.5 and -0.1 respectively.  The results showed 
an increment in world cotton prices of 12% on average over the period 1997-2001.  He 
w P
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  14conducted a sensitivity analysis for various elasticities [( 05 . 0 − = d ε and  s ε = 0.7) to 
(6 . 0 − = d ε and  s ε = 0.15)] and the results show a price ranged from 2.9 % to 13.4 %.  
Shepherd (2004) studied the effects of U.S. cotton subsidies removal on cotton 
international price, production, and consumption.  He utilized a two stage approach.  
First, a vector autoregression (VAR) was used to build a subsidy-inclusive model of the 
world cotton market.  Then, the model was tested against historical data.  Second, he 
employed this model to test more subsidies will lead to lower price.  The data used 
covered the period 1965/2002.  The cotton prices were proxied by the IMF’s “Liverpool 
price”.  The total world production and consumption, and the stocks change over the 
period were obtained from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).  U.S. cotton 
subsides were proxied by U.S. direct payments (in nominal terms) to the cotton 
producers.  He developed a VAR(j) model in which the dependent variable Y (initially 
the vector of all data series) was a function of three deterministic terms: a constant, a 
dummy variable (which is zero for years between 1965/1973 and one for 1974-2002), and 
a time trend.  A modified likelihood ratio test (Sims, 1980) was used for hypothesis 
testing.  The results suggested that unexpected changes in subsidy policies increases the 
world prices marginally before decreasing these prices.  The historical impact of 
subsidies was also examined and Sheperd reached the conclusion that subsidies do not 
seem to explain the price fluctuations over time.  In relation to the effects of subsidy 
removal, Shepherd ran three scenarios using a stochastic dynamic simulations: removal 
of 10%, 50% and 90% subsidy, respectively.  While a removal of 50% or 90% subsidy 
affects the cotton world prices, the paper concluded that these results were not 
  15statistically significant, and therefore the impact of cotton subsidies removal in the 
international cotton prices is almost nil.  
Gillson et al., (2004) used the Goreux (2004) model and adapted it by assuming 
first a single world cotton market and, second a perfectly fragmented one in which the 
producers cannot enter or exit.  The 1999/00 subsidy data was used in this study.  Data 
for production and bilateral trade were taken from the FAOSTAT Agriculture Database 
and COMTRADE database (2003).  The initial cotton price assumed was equal to $1.16 
per kilogram.  The assumed elasticities were –0.1 and 0.5 for the demand and supply, 
respectively.  Four simulations were run: a) single market with uniform elasticity (S/U), 
b) fragmented market with uniform elasticity (F/U), c) single world market and 
differentiated elasticities (S/D), and fragmented world market and differentiated 
elasticities (F/D).  The model predicted a cotton price increase of 18%, 20%, 22%, and 
28% for the simulations S/U, F/U, S/D, and S/F, respectively.  
Anderson and Valenzuela (2006) estimated the impacts of a) full removal of 
cotton subsidies and tariffs, b) a possible U.S. partial cotton policy reforms as a 
consequence of the WTO U.S./Brazil dispute, and c) the Hong Kong Trade Ministerial 
decision in December 2005.  For the first case (complete cotton liberalization) they used 
an adapted Version 6.05 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP).  This version 
contains data for 2001, but Anderson and Valenzuela modified the subsidies from $1 
billion (2001) to $3 billion (2000/2002).  The implementation of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Textiles was also included in this database.  The results estimated a 12.9% 
average increase in the international cotton prices.  In the second scenario (U.S. only 
partial reform), the removal of the step two programs with a one-third cut on the domestic 
  16subsidies predicted a rise in cotton world prices of 4.4%.  The third scenario (Doha 
Development Agenda) included a one-third reduction in rich countries cotton subsidies 
with quota and duty free for the LDCs countries to the developed countries and complete 
export subsidy elimination.  The results estimated an increase of 3.2% in the world cotton 
prices. 
Given the divergence in these studies’ framework and conclusions it is not an easy 
task to choose one in order to analyze the impacts of cotton trade liberalization on the 
Zambian cotton sector.   We use a different export price change in each of the alternative 
scenarios, i.e. the Doha Round policies, and the African countries’ proposals.  In the first 
case we utilize the Anderson and Valenzuela estimation (i.e. 3.2%) because this study 
modeled the last WTO cotton agreements.  For the African countries proposals case we 
use the 12 % increment predicted by Anderson and Valenzuela for being closer to the 
actual world cotton price situation.  
 
The Zambian Social Accounting Matrix  
 
A social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is a square matrix which provides information 
on all the transactions taken in a specified economy during a certain period of time.  Each 
SAM cell represents the income or receipt from its column account to its row account or, 
alternatively, each cell shows the expenditure or outlay to the account of its column.  
Therefore, each SAM’s account total receipts (row total) equal total outlays (column 
total). 
This analysis is undertaken by developing a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model of the Zambian economy based on the 2001 Zambian SAM (Thurlow, 
  17Evans, and Robinson, 2001).  Zambian macro SAM is consistent with the World Bank’s 
2001 Revised Minimum Standards Model (RMSM) of Zambia.   At the micro level, the 
macro SAM is disaggregated using national and foreign trade accounts,  the input-output 
structure contained in the 1995 Zambia SAM, produced by IFPRI (Hausner, 1999), and 
the 1998 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS).  The values are in billions of 
2001 Zambian Kwacha (ZK).   
 Table 2 shows the aggregate Zambian macro SAM which distinguishes between 
different accounts: activities, commodities, factors, households, enterprises, government, 
savings, and rest of the world.  Each of the entries in the macro SAM are disaggregated in 
the micro SAM. 
The macro SAM activities accounts represent the firms that produce Zambian 
commodities and services.  Its flows are valued at producer’s price.  In the micro SAM, 
these activities are divided into fourteen agricultural sectors (maize smallholder, maize 
large-scale, drought tolerant staples, groundnuts, sugar, cotton, tobacco, coffee, wheat, 
horticulture, other crops, livestock, fishing, and forestry)  and fourteen non-agricultural 
sectors (mining, food beverages and processed tobacco, textiles and garment, wood and 
furniture, fertilizer and industrial chemicals, other manufacturing, electricity and water, 
equipment and machinery, construction, trade and transport services, tourism, other 
private and community services, financial services, and public services).  
In the macro SAM (Table 2) the activities row indicate that activities receive ZK 
23,670 and ZK 2,500 billions from commodities and households, respectively.  In other 
words, commodities pay 23,670 to activities (marketed output) while households pay ZK 
2,500 billions (marketed output).  In the micro SAM, these values are disaggregated by 
  18activities, commodities, and households.  The total activity income is ZK 26,170 billions 
(Table 2).  
The commodities accounts correspond to activity outputs and imports.  Its flows 
are valued at market prices, including transaction cost and taxes.  The micro SAM 
disaggregates the commodities into fourteen agricultural sectors following the same 
classification as the activities.   
The commodity receipts (SAM commodities column) come from the activities 
(intermediate demand), commodities (transaction costs i.e., domestic, imports, and 
exports marketing margins), households (households final consumption), government 
(government consumption), investment (investment), and rest of the world (exports, 
valued at f.o.b. prices).  That is, activities pay ZK 14,118 billions to commodities.  
Commodities provide ZK 5,879 to commodities in the form of transaction cost.  
Household expend ZK 8,241 billions in commodities while government pays 1,704, 
investment ZK 2,627 and the rest of the world ZK 3,760 billions.  Therefore, the total 
demand is 36,346 billions (Table 2).           
The macro SAM (Table 2) total factor income (ZK 11,844 billions) is composed 
by the value-added (receipt from the activities) and the factor income from the rest of the 
world (receipt from the ROW).  The activities pay factors ZK 11,844 billions while the 
ROW does not pay in Zambian case.  These receipts/payments are disaggregated by 
factors in the micro SAM.  In the micro SAM the factors are disaggregated into eight 
categories: uneducated labor, primary schooling labor, secondary schooling labor, post-
secondary schooling labor, agricultural capital, mining resource capital, other, and land.   
  19The households in the macro SAM (Table 2 households’ row) receive payments 
from the production factors, from other households, enterprises, government, and the 
ROW.  Concretely, the factors pay ZK 5,978 billions to households as factor income to 
households, the households pay ZK 169 billions as inter-households transfers, the 
enterprises provide ZK 5,365 billions as surplus to households, and the government and 
rest of the world ZK 453 and ZK 7 billions respectively as transfers.  The total 
households income is 11,972 (Table 2).   In the micro SAM the households are divided in 
rural and urban.  The rural households are clasifed in remote small scale, remote medium 
scale, remote non-farm, non-remote small scale, non-remote medium scale, non-remote 
large-scale, and non-remote non-farm households.  The urban households are divided into 
low-skilled employee, private employee, public employee, and high-skilled employee 
households. 
The enterprises (Table 2 enterprises’ row) receipts come from the production 
factors and the government.  The production factors payment to enterprises (VA capital) 
is equal to ZK 5,866 billions.  The government provides ZK 106 billions to the 
enterprises as government transfers.  In the micro SAM the enterprises are divided in 
enterprises-mining and enterprises non-mining.  The total enterprises income is equal to 
ZK 5,972 billions (see Table 2).   
The government receives its income (Table 2 government’s row) from the 
activities, commodities, households, and enterprises.  The activities pay ZK 208 billions 
to the government, while the commodities, households, and enterprises gives ZK 877, ZK 
947, and ZK 296 billions, respectively.  In the micro SAM the government account is 
divided in government, three taxes (direct, producer, and sales), and tariffs accounts.     
  20The savings account total recipients (Table 2 savings’ row) come from the 
commodities (households’ savings), the production factors (enterprise savings), 
government (government savings), and the rest of the world (foreign savings).  The 
households, enterprises, and foreign savings are ZK 115, ZK 311, and 2,629 billions, 
respectively while the government has a deficit for ZK 428 billions.    
The rest of the world receives payments (Table 2 ROW row) from Zambian 
commodities, and government.  The Zambian commodities give ZK 5,902 billions as 
imports (Table 4.23 for disaggregated values).  The government pays to the rest of the 
world ZK 493 billions as transfers.    
 Based on this SAM we will develop a CGE model and use the General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) to run baseline and alternate scenarios simulations.  The 
baseline, as we have said, encompasses the existing policies whereas the two scenarios 
incorporate (a) the Doha Round policies, and (b) the African countries proposals, 
respectively. 
The model 
  The impacts of both the Doha Round agreement and the possible consequences of 
the African countries’ cotton initiative are modeled using the Lofgren et al. (2002) static 
model, which follows Dervis, Melo and Robinson (1992) approach.  This model, 
developed at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) is also the 
reference used in Fontana (2002 and 2003).   
The model mathematically represents the economic agents’ behavior in a 
Walrasian economy where markets are cleared in all the sectors.  The equations utilized 
  21in this model are divided into four blocks: prices, production and trade, institutions, and 
systems constraints.  The price block is formed by nine equations: import price, export 
price, domestic price of domestic non-traded goods, absorption, marketed output value, 
activity price, aggregate intermediate input price, activity revenue and cost, consumer 
price index, and producer price index for non-traded market output.   
The production and trade block are formed by seventeen functions: activity 
production function, value-added intermediate-input ratio, demand for aggregate value-
added,  aggregate intermediate input demand, value- added and factor demand, factor 
demand, disaggregated intermediate input demand, commodity and production allocation, 
output aggregation,   first-order condition for output aggregation function, output 
transformation, export-domestic supply ratio, output transformation, composite supply, 
import-domestic demand ratio, composite supply for non-imported outputs and non-
produced imports, and transaction services demand.  
Eleven equations form the institutional block: factor income, institutional factor 
income, domestic non-government institutions income, intra-institutional transfers, 
household consumption, and household consumption in marketed output, home 
consumption, investment demand, government consumption demand, government 
revenue, and government expenditure. 
The system constraint block consist of eight equilibrium conditions: factor 
markets, composite commodity markets, current-account balance for the rest of the world 
in foreign currency, government balance, direct institutional tax rates, institutional 
savings rates, savings-investment balance, and total absorption.   
  22Representative agents in various sectors apply microeconomic behavior, i.e., 
maximize their objective functions subject to certain constraints.  Producers maximize 
profits given the resource endowments; assuming perfect competition (i.e. fixed prices).   
Factor use is modeled by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function.  
We assume an elasticity value of - 0.6.  Once these factors are determined, some of them 
enter into a Leontief technology to produce some commodities and the remaining factors 
along with intermediate input enter into a CES technology to produce other commodities.  
The final ratio between value -added and intermediate inputs is determined by the 
interaction of their relative prices.   The activity’s output final price is determined by the 
aggregate intermediate input and value-added prices and the value-added taxes.  
The producers marketed output allocation decision is governed by a constant 
elasticity of transformation (CET) function which, by distinguishing between domestic 
and exported and domestic goods, captures these products’ quality differences.  
Following Fontana (2003) we assume an elasticity of substitution of –2.0, -1.5, and –0.8 
for agriculture, manufacturing, and services sectors respectively.   Producers, in order to 
maximize profits, will sell in the market (domestic or international) with higher price.  
The international price is considered fixed for Zambia, being a small country.  
Therefore, the optimal mix between exports and domestic sales will be determined by 
these relative prices interaction.  
A CES Armigton specification captures the domestic output and imports 
imperfect substitutability.  Here also we utilize Fontana’s (2003) elasticities assuming 
an elasticity of substitution of –2.0, -1.5, and –0.8 for agriculture, manufacturing, and 
services sectors respectively.  Cost minimization of domestic demand leads to an 
  23optimal mix between imports and domestic output determined by the interaction of 
relative prices for imports and domestic goods.  For the reason explained above we 
assume that Zambia faces fixed world price. 
When commodities are exported, imported or sold domestically, transaction cost 
emerges.  The quantity of commodity demanded as transaction service input is given by 
the sum of all these trade inputs generated by the exported, imported, and domestic 
sales activities. 
Each household face the problem of maximizing Stone-Greary utility function, 
subject to its budget constraint.  We assume identical preferences among the 
households.  This problem leads to two linear expenditure systems (LES) as the 
representation of consumers spending in both, marketed commodities and, home 
commodities.  And, therefore, each of these LES divided by its relevant price gives the 
marketed commodities demand and home commodities demand respectively.   
The household consumption is financed principally with factor incomes 
generated during the production process, which are also the major income source for the 
enterprises.  The factor income is defined as the sum of the activity return computed as 
the multiplication of the activity wages and the level of employment.  In addition, both 
receive transfers.  These transfers come from the rest of the world, government and 
other domestic institutions in the case of households.     
Investment is financed by households and enterprises savings.  The sum of the 
stock changes and the gross fixed capital formation (i.e. total investment) must be equal 
to the total savings within the economy.   
The government deficit is defined as the difference between government 
  24revenues (i.e. taxes, tariffs, factor income and rest of the world’s transfers) and the 
expenditures (i.e. consumption and transfers to non-government institutions).  This 
deficit is financed through the capital market. 
   We will run simulations for baseline and alternate scenarios.  The baseline 
encompasses the existing policies whereas the two scenarios incorporate (a) the Doha 
Round policies, and (b) the African countries proposals, respectively.  Both policies will 
be undertaken by changing the cotton world price, considered exogenous in the model for 
Zambia being a small country.  As stated previously, a 3.2% world price change in the 
Doha Round policies scenario, and a 12 % in the African countries’ proposal scenario 
will be used.   
  In order to balance different macro-accounts we establish different macro-
closures.  For the current account of the balance of payments we assume that a fixed level 
of foreign savings is maintained by a flexible exchange rate adjusts.  A savings-driven 
closure is chosen to achieve the savings-investment balance.  That is, we assume that the 
marginal propensities to save are fixed and investment quantities are flexible.  The same 
assumptions are held in other studies such as Fontana (2002 and 2003), Thurlow and 
Wobst (2004), and Löfgren et.al. (2004). 
  Finally, for the market closures we assume that labor is unemployed and mobile 
and that the wage is fixed for each activity.  We make this assumption because one of the 
major characteristics in the developing countries is the unemployment.  In the case of the 
capital market we assume that capital is fully employed and activity-specific. 
 
The simulation results  
 
  25Cotton protection is one of the most important problems not only in the 
international trade arena but also in some of the poorest countries in the world, which 
have begun to play key roles in the WTO negotiations.  The simulations performed in this 
paper show the extent of the benefits of implementation of the Doha WTO Round in 
Zambia and the reality of the Doha agreement versus the African countries’ policy 
initiative during the last WTO Hong Kong conference.   
We conducted simulations for baseline and two alternate scenarios.  The baseline 
encompasses the existing policies whereas the two scenarios incorporate: (a) the Doha 
Round policies (duty and quota free access for developing countries’ cotton to developed 
countries’ markets, and export subsidy removal by the developed countries), and (b) the 
African countries’ proposals (elimination of domestic cotton supports by 2008, free 
access for the LCD’s cotton and cotton products to rich country markets, and removal of 
cotton export subsidies).  These scenarios are run by considering the world price changes 
in the Doha Round policies and the African countries Initiative.  In the Doha Round (DR) 
scenario we increase the international cotton price by 3.2%.  In the African countries 
proposal (AP) scenario we raise the world price by 12%.  We focus on the effects of these 
price increases on the Zambian cotton sector (production, exports, prices), and agrarian 
population welfare. 
One of the most important effects of this external shock (i.e., increase in the world 
cotton export price) on the Zambian cotton sector is the increase of the Zambian cotton 
export price.  In the DR scenario this price rises by a 4.23 % while it increases by 15.65% 
in the AP scenario (Table 3.1).  As we can see from Table 3.2, this higher cotton export 
  26price leads to an increase in the Zambian cotton exports by 11.12% and 43.20 %  in the 
DR and AP scenarios respectively.  Therefore the Zambian cotton export sector will 
benefit greatly from the rich countries’ cotton trade liberalization, gaining more market 
share abroad as the cotton protection comes down in the developed countries. 
In contrast, on the import side, the effect of the cotton trade liberalization 
decreases the Zambian cotton import prices in both scenarios (Table 3.1).  In the UR 
scenario this decrease is 0.14%.  In the AP scenario the cotton import prices decline by 
0.58%.  Nevertheless, the import quantity responds to these changes in prices are 
different in both scenarios (Table 3.2).  In the DR scenario the quantity imported hardly 
changes, while in the AP simulation the quantity imported increases by 0.30% as a 
consequence of the lower prices.  These different effects are a consequence of the 
different domestic-import price ratio variations in both scenarios. 
The gross revenue per activity unit or activity price increases noticeably in both 
simulations (Table 3.1).  In the DR scenario the quantity supply increases by 0.18% while 
in the AP scenario by 0.49%.  Consequently, the quantity supplied increases.  The gross 
revenue increases by 3.15% in the DR scenario and 12.16% in the AP scenario (Table 
3.1).  Again we can see that the cotton sector benefits from the world cotton free markets. 
As a consequence of all these price changes, quantities of aggregate marketed 
domestic cotton (domestic marketed sales of domestic cotton plus exports) and cotton 
composite supply (domestic use of marketed domestic output plus imports) increase.  The 
increase in the quantity of aggregate market output (cotton) is quite large in both 
scenarios.  In the DR scenario this quantity increases by 8.84% while in the AP it rises by 
  2734.70% (Table 3.2).  The cotton composite supply increases by 0.1% in the DR scenario 
and by 0.41% in the AP simulation (Table 3.2).  The cotton intermediate demand also is 
higher in both scenarios (Table 3.3).  In every sector, demand for cotton as intermediate 
input increases, more so in the AP scenario because of increase in processed cotton 
exports.   
Another important effect of cotton trade liberalization is the extremely high 
increase in cotton labor demand, which improves Zambian employment (Table 3.4).  In 
the DR scenario each Zambian labor category is benefited by almost 12.52%.  The larger 
is the market liberalization, the higher are the labor gains as the AP scenario results show.  
In this simulation the labor demand by the cotton sector increases by almost 53.06%.   
So, Zambian labor will benefit greatly by a free international cotton market.   
This impact on labor demand has a positive effect on labor income, which 
increases in all categories (Table 3.5) in both scenarios.  In fact, even capital income 
(other than mining) rises, as does land income because of the higher demand for these 
inputs as cotton production increases.  Only mining capital is injured, but by a very low 
percentage.  Concretely, the labor income increases between 0.12% (post-secondary 
labor) and 0.5% (uneducated labor) in the DR scenario.  In this scenario the capital 
(different than mining) rises by 0.14% while agricultural capital does the same by 0.9%.  
Land income increases by 1.28%.  As can be expected, these increases are higher in the 
AP scenario, ranging from 0.48% (post-secondary labor) to almost 2.07% (uneducated 
labor).  In this case, capital (other than mining) income increases by 0.59% while 
agricultural capital does the same by 3.82%.  Land income rises by 5.51%.  Mining 
  28income decreases by 1.70%.  Within the labor income gains, uneducated labor benefits 
more, as does the agricultural capital in the case of the capital gains as the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem predicts.  The elimination of world trade distortions will increase the 
cotton relative price raising the real return of the intensive factor i.e., uneducated labor, in 
cotton production. 
Therefore, all the production factors, with the exception of mining capital, 
benefits with the free trade in cotton (Table 3.6).  This translates to higher incomes in all 
domestic non-governmental institutions.  These income increments go from the lowest 
(0.01% and 0.07%) to the highest (0.54% and 2.31%) in the DR and AP scenarios 
respectively.  The major income gains are concentrated in the remote rural medium-scale 
households in both cases, while the lowest benefits are found in the urban high-skilled 
employers.  The mining enterprises, the only losers, decreases their income by 0.2% in 




Cotton rich countries’ protection and its effects had become a key issue in the 
WTO negotiations especially since the US-Brazil dispute and African Cotton Initiative 
were brought to the fore front.  In the last WTO Conference some changes in cotton trade 
had been reached but they fell short from African countries’ demands.  In this paper we 
have developed a CGE model of the Zambian economy based on the 2001 Zambian SAM 
to: (a) contribute to the analysis of the impact of the Doha Round agreement on the cotton 
sector in Zambia, (b) compare the Doha Round and the African countries’ proposal 
  29outcomes to the Zambian economy, and (c) render more information about further 
agricultural trade liberalization and its implications for the poor countries.   
The results illustrate that the African countries’ demands are justified.  We have 
shown the huge benefits of cotton trade liberalization to the Zambian economy.  The less 
is the rich countries’ protection, the more are the Zambian gains (i.e., the Cotton initiative 
policies provide much more gains to the African cotton producers countries than the 
Uruguay Round policies).  We have demonstrated the rich countries protection removal 
(translating to a higher international cotton price) leads to a Zambian cotton export price 
increase which augments Zambian exports.  This benefits Zambian cotton exporters 
significantly.  The activity price (defined as producer prices times yield) increases also 
with more cotton market competition.  
Another important effect of the cotton trade liberalization is the increase in the 
labor demand by the cotton sector.  This implies that the elimination of the rich countries 
protection will alleviate considerably the Zambian 50% unemployment, one of the causes 
of poverty.  Knowing that 85% of the labor force is employed in the agrarian sector, one 
can realize how important it is for African countries that the Cotton Initiative is accepted.  
The uneducated labor benefits the most.  Further, all capital except mining rises, 
increasing agricultural capital as can be expected. 
As we have shown in the previous chapter, more the cotton trade liberalization, 
higher the increase in employment and, consequently, the greater the increase in 
household’s income.   All domestic non-governmental institutions except mining 
enterprises obtain higher incomes due less intervention in the cotton market. The major 
  30income gains are concentrated in the rural remote medium scale households in both cases, 
while the lowest benefits are found in the urban high-skilled employers.  In Zambia 
extreme poverty is concentrated in rural areas where 74% of the households live under 
severe poverty.  
To summarize, cotton trade liberalization will improve the Zambian economy and 
the welfare which underscores the importance of considering the African countries 
proposal for the cotton liberalization.  This analysis with almost all certainty can be 
extended to the rest of the African countries in which cotton constitutes an important 
crop. 
 
  31 
References 
Anderson, Kym and Will Martin. 2005. “Scenarios for Global Trade Reform,” Chapter 2 in 
Hertel and Winters (eds.), Poverty and the WTO: Impacts of the Doha  Development Agenda 
(forthcoming). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.    
 
Anderson, Kym and Will Martin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe 2005. “Global  Impacts 
of the Doha Scenarios on Poverty,” Policy Research Working Paper  3735, The World Bank. 
 
Anderson, K., E. Valenzuela (2006), ‘WTO’s Doha Cotton Initiative: 




Aksoy, M. Ataman 2005, “The Evolution of Agricultural Trade Flows”, in M. Ataman Aksoy 
and John. C. Beghin (eds) Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries. (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank).  
 
Baffes, J. 2001 “Policy Reforms in the Cotton Market.” In Commodity Market Reforms: Lessons 
from Two Decades, ed. A. Takamasa, J. Baffes, D. Larson, and P. Varangis. Regional and 
Sectoral Studies, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
 
Baffes, J. 2002. “Tanzania’s Cotton Sector: Constraints and Challenges in a Global 
Environment”. Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 42, December 2002. 
 
Baffes, J. 2004. “Cotton: Marketing Setting, Policies, Issues, and Facts.” In Aksoy and Beghin  
eds. 2004. 
 
Baffes, J. 2005a. “The Cotton Problem.” The World Bank Research Observer 20:109-144. 
Centre for International Economics (2002), Trade Distortions and Cotton Markets:  Implications 
for Global Cotton Producers, May. 
 
Baffes, J. 2005b. “Cotton and the developing Countries: Implications for Development”. John 
Baffes. Chapter 9 of  Trade, Doha and Development: A Window into the Issues, ed. Newfarmer, 
Richard. World Bank 2005. 
 
Balat, Jorge F. and Guido G. Porto. 2005a. “The WTO Doha Round, Cotton Sector  Dynamics 
and Poverty Trends in Zambia,” Policy Research Working Paper 3697,  The World Bank. 
 
Balat, Jorge F. and Porto, Guido (2005b) "Globalization and Complementary Policies: Poverty 
Impacts in Rural Zambia". NBER Working Paper No. W11175. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=684701  
 
  32Brambilla, Irene and Porto, Guido (2005) "Farm Productivity and Market Structure. Evidence 
from Cotton Reforms in Zambia". Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper 
No. 919 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=770786 
 
Dorothée Boccanfuso & Luc Savard, 2006. "Impact analysis of cotton subsidies on poverty: A 
CGE macro-accounting approach" Cahiers de recherche 06-04, Département d'Économique de la 
Faculté d'administration à l'Université de Sherbrooke 
 
 
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). The World Factbook Available in 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/za.html 
 
FAO (Food and agricultural Organization of the United nations), Economic and Social 
Department Statistics. Available in http://www.fao.org/es/ess/toptrade/trade.asp 
 
FAO 2003 Special Report FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Zambia. 
Available in http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/ 
docrep/005/y9664e/y9664e00.htm 
 
FAPRI (Food and agricultural Policy Research Institute), (2002a). “ The Doha Round of the 
World Trade Organization: Liberalization of Agricultural Markets and its Impacts on 
 Developing Economics.” Mimeo. 
 
FAPRI (Food and agricultural Policy Research Institute). 2002b. “The Doha Round of the World 
Trade Organization: Appraising Further 
Liberalization of Agricultural Markets”, Working Paper 02-WP 317, November 2002. 
 
Fontana, Marzia, 2002. Modelling the effects of trade on women: the case of Zambia, IDS 
Working Paper 155, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. 
 
Fontana, Marzia, Modeling the Effects of Trade on Women at Work and at Home: A 
Comparative Perspective, IFPRI, Washington D.C., 2003 
 
Gillson, I., C.Poulton, K.Balcombe, and S.Page.2004. “Understanding the Impact ofCotton 




Gillson et al 2004. “Understanding the Impact of Cotton Subsidies on Developing Countries”. 
Working Paper, May 2004. 
 
Goreux, L. and J. Macrae 2003, ‘Reforming the Cotton Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa’, World 
Bank Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 47. 
 
Goreux, Louis 2004. Prejudice Caused By Industrialized Countries Subsidies to  Cotton Sectors 
in Western and Central Africa. Second Edition. 
  33http://www.fao.org/es/esc/common/ecg/47647_en_Goreux_Prejudicef.pdf (accessed December  
6, 2004). 
 
Hausner, U., 1999, “A 1995 Social Accounting Matrix for Zambia”, TDM Discussion Paper No, 
49, IFPRI, Washington D.C. 
 
Hoekman, B., A. Nicita, and M. Olarreaga. 2004. “Can Doha Deliver the Development Round? ” 
Mimeo, World Bank. 
 
ICAC. Undated. “Methodology of World Textile Demand Projections”. Mimeo. 
 
ICAC. 2002. Production and Trade Policies Affecting the Cotton Industry. Washington, DC:  
ICAC. 
 
ICAC. 2003. “Impacts of Government Measures on African Cotton Producers”, Statement by  
the Executive Director to the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board, 13 October 2003,  
www.icac.org. 
 
ICAC. 2003a. “Government Support to the Cotton Industry”, Mimeo, www.icac.org. 
 
Löfgren, H., Lee Harris, R. and Robinson, S., 2002, .A Standard Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) Model in GAMS. Microcomputers in Policy Research 
Vol. 5. Washington, D.C.: IFPRI. 
 
Löfgren, H., Thurlow, J., and Robinson, S. 2004. “Prospects for Growth and Poverty-Reduction 
in Zambia, 2001-2015”, Development Strategies and Governance Division Discussion Paper No. 
12, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. Input paper into World Bank. 
2004. Zambia: Country Economic Memorandum, Washington, D.C.  
 
Malik, Ahmad Rashid 2005, The Hong Kong Round. The Nation, 22 December 2005. Available 
in http://nation.com.pk/daily/dec-2005/22/columns4.php. 
 
Oxfam. 2002. “Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of US Cotton Subsidies on Africa”, Briefing  
Paper 30, www.oxfam.org. 
 
Pan, S., S. Mohanty, D. Ethridge, and M. Fadiga. 2004. “The Impacts of U.S. Cotton Programs 
on the World Market: An Analysis of Brazilian and West African WTO Petitions.”Department of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics, Texas Tech University, Lubbock. 
 
Poonyth, D., A. Sarris, R. Sharma, and S. Shui. 2004. “The Impact of Domestic and Trade 
Policies on the World Cotton Market.”Commodity and Trade Policy Research Working Paper, 
Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. 
 
Poulton, C., P. Gibbon et al. 2004. ‘Competition and Coordination in Liberalised 
African Cotton Market Systems’, World Development Vol. 32 (3). 
 
  34Quirke, D. 2001, Trade Distortions and Cotton Markets: Implications for Australian Cotton 
Producers, Centre for International Economics, Australia. 
 
Reeves, G., D. Vincent, D. Quirke, and S. Wyatt. 2001. “Trade Distortions and Cotton Markets: 
Implications for Global Cotton Producers.” Center for International Economics, Canberra. 
 
Shepherd, B. 2004. “The Impact of U.S. Subsidies on the World Market of 
Cotton: A Reassessment.” Groupe d’Economie Mondiale (GEM), Institut 
d’Etudes Politiques de Paris. 
 
Sumner, D. A. 2003. “A quantitative simulation analysis of the impacts of U.S. cotton subsidies 
on cotton prices and quantities.” Mimeo, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
University of California, Davis.  
 
Tokarik, S., 2003, “Measuring the impact of distortions in agricultural trade in partial and 
general  equilibrium”, IMF Working Paper WP/03/110, May,2003. 
 
Townsend, Terry, and Andrei Guitchounts. 1994. “A Survey of Cotton Income and Price Support  
Programs.” Proceedings of the Beltwide Cotton Conferences. Washington, D.C.: National Cotton  
Council of America. 
 
Thurlow, James, and Peter Wobst. 2004. “The Road to Pro-Poor Growth in Zambia.” DSGC 
Discussion Paper 16. International Food Policy Research Institute, Development Strategy and 
Governance Division, Washington, DC. [http://www.ifpri.org/divs/dsgd/dp/ 
papers/dsgdp16.pdf]. May 2005. Toole, M. J., and R. J. Waldman. 1997. “ 
 
United Nations 2005. Zambia Millennium Development Goals. Available in 
http://www.undp.org.zm/undptest/docs/MDGR2005.pdf 
 
Valderrama, Carlos. 2000. “A Revision of the ICAC Price Model”, Mimeo, July-August  2000, 
Washington, DC: ICAC.   
World Trade Organization, 2002. Request for Consultations by Brazil, WT/DS267/1, September 
27, 2002. 
World Trade Organization 2003.  Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali. WTO 
Negotiations on Agriculture. Poverty Reduction: Sectorial Iniciative in Favour of Cotton. (WTO, 
TN/AG/GEN/4. 16 May 2003. 
 
World Trade Organization, 2003. Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Iniciative in Favour of Cotton. 
Joint proposal by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali. Geneva, 16 May, 2003.  
 
World Trade Organization, 2004. United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton 
(WT/DS267/R).Geneva 
 
  35World Trade Organization, 2005. Proposed Elements of Modalities in Connection with the 
Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton. Communication from the African Group 
(TN/AG/SCC/GEN/2), 22 April 2005. 
 
World Trade Organization, 2005. Doha Work Programme. Ministerial Declaration 
(WT/MIN(05)/DEC) . Adopted on 18 December 2005. 22 December 2005. 
 






































  36TABLE 1: STUDIES DEALING WITH COTTON INTERNATIONAL PRICES 
CHANGES AFTER TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
 
 
Study Model  Data  Sector  Barriers 
removed  





1994/95 Cotton  Subsidies  United 
States 
6 cents related to 1999/00 (on 
average) 











All  11.44%(on average) under complete 
liberalization  
2.93% under trade distortions 
removal. 








All  15%(on average) under complete 
liberalization  
4% under trade distortions removal 
Tokaric (2003)  Partial 
equilibrium 













 12.6% (1999/00) 
10.8% (2003/07) 








Cotton Farm  programs  United 
States 
2.14% for 2004/05  
0.86% for 2013/14 
Poonyth et al. 
(2004) 
 
ATPSM  1996/00  Cotton  Subsidies  All  Between 3.1% and 4.8% 
Goreux (2004)  Partial 
equilibrium 













Between 18% and 28%. 
Shepherd 
(2004) 































  37TABLE 2: THE ZAMBIAN MACRO-SAM (billions of current local currency i.e., Kwacha 
 
                    Activities Commodities Factors Households Enterprises Government Investment ROW Total
Activities   Marketed
production 





























Factors  Value-added 
11,844 
             Factor income
from ROW 
  Total factor 
income 
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Transfers  Total household 
income  7 
11,972 
Enterprises                 VA capital
5,866 
  Transfers to
enterprises 
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Transfers   Total enterprise 
income    
5,972 
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TABLE 3: THE SIMULATIONS RESULTS 
 
TABLE 3.1. CHANGES IN PRICES  
 










Price of imports  3.788105 -0.14 
 
-0.58 
Supply price  1.000000 -1.04  -3.12 
Demand price   3.788105 -0.23  -0.67 
Activity price   1.000000 3.15  12.16 
 
TABLE 3.2. CHANGES IN QUANTITIES 
 
  Base   Doha  round 
scenario %  
African countries 
proposals % 









Quantity supply  24.225551 0.18  0.49 






Quantity of aggregate 







TABLE 3.3. QUANTITY OF INTERMEDIATE DEMAND  
 




Cotton  0.054089         8.84  34.70 
Food beverages and processed 
tobacco 
0.091712 0.16  0.68 
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 TABLE. 3.4. QUANTITY DEMANDED OF FACTOR FROM COTTON 
 





Uneducated labor  30.810492 12.52  52.06 
Primary schooling labor  25.588305 12.52  52.06 
Secondary schooling labor  3.312716 12.52  52.06 
Post-secondary schooling 
labor  
0.888319 12.52  52.06 
 
TABLE 3.5 FACTOR INCOME VARIATIONS 
 





Uneducated labor      1519.542655 0.50 2.068291 
Primary schooling labor    1771.641782 0.37 1.53 
Secondary schooling labor    1057.969333 0.17 0.71 
Post-secondary schooling 
labor   
1100.734581 0.12 0.48 
Agricultural capital       390.209991 0.88  3.82 
Mining capital  785.018372 -0.42  -1.69 
Other capital  5081.353337 0.14 0.59 
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TABLE 3.6 DOMESTIC NON-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS INCOME 
VARIATIONS 
 




Enterprises-mining      1272.195074   -0.20  -0.83 
Enterprises-others       4617.308856   0.14  0.58 
Rural remote small scale 
households    
1261.831190 0.49 2.06 
Rural remote medium scale 
households    
99.603674 0.54  2.31 
Rural remote non-farm 
households    
139.872197 0.19  0.82 
Rural non-remote small scale 
households      
1571.902871 0.45 1.90 
Rural non-remote medium 
scale households    
168.235099 0.47  2.00 
Rural non-remote large scale 
households         
143.313186 0.22  0.92 
Rural non-remote non-farm 
households    
347.495369 0.19  0.80 
Urban low-skilled self-
employed households 
2738.531895 0.17 0.70 
Urban private employee 
households        
1513.565721 0.15 0.61 
Urban public employee 
households 
2764.046456   0.12  0.50 
Urban high-skilled employers  1113.067801 0.016 0.07 
 
 
 